William James and 18th-century anthropology: Holism, scepticism and the doctrine of experience by Carroll, Jerome
 1 
 
Jerome Carroll 
William James and eighteenth century anthropology: holism, skepticism and the 
doctrine of experience 
Introduction 
James and anthropology 
Max Scheler, the initiator of philosophical anthropology in the twentieth century, follows William 
James in employing the term radical empiricism as the title for his approach to epistemology (see 
Scheler 1973, 138). This reflects other common aspects of their thinking: the refutation or radical 
reconfiguration of philosophical categories, such as the a priori; the inclusion of emotional aspects 
like feeling or temperament in their accounts of what determines experience and knowledge; and an 
emphasis on concrete or lived experience, for instance as evidenced by the focus on activity (James) 
or the act (Scheler). Such overlaps between William James and the twentieth century tradition of 
philosophical anthropology have not gone unnoticed. In an essay titled ‘The anthropological 
foundations of William James’s philosophy’ Michael DeArmey argues that ‘a radical theory of human 
nature, a theory which has gone previously unnoticed, rests quietly at the foundation of James’s 
thought.’ (DeArmey 1986, 17) He concludes that 
William James’s phenomenological insights are part of a much larger program – the working out 
of a distinctive theory of human nature. I have tried to show that James is first and foremost a 
pioneering philosophical anthropologist, America’s central representative of the anthropological 
movement. (DeArmey 1986, 31) 
For DeArmey this anthropological programme is evident in James’s synthesis of phenomenological 
method – which he characterises as transcendental or spiritual – and his ‘strong training and interests 
in biology and medicine’: ‘More significantly, their ambitions were to unite the important findings 
from both areas by means of a root conception of human nature.’ (DeArmey 1986, 25) In particular, 
DeArmey sees philosophical anthropology as offering an alternative to science’s reductive approach 
to causation, in the form of what he calls its teleology: ‘man is the end-seeker’ who ‘can choose or 
“affirm” goals’. (DeArmey 1986, 25, 26) In this vein he refers to James’s ‘radically teleological 
anthropology’ (DeArmey 1986, 18), which he sees as being inherited from Kant’s Anthropology from 
a Pragmatic Point of View, published in 1798 after many years of lecturing on the topic and which 
James read in the 1880s. 
It may be necessary to point out here that the tradition of (philosophical) anthropology that we are 
concerned with here is not comparative ethnology, but a more philosophical enquiry about 
humankind’s essential nature and its relationship to the world around. Scheler is key contributor to 
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philosophical anthropology in its classical phase in the twentieth century, but Kant’s Anthropology is 
one of at least twenty books published in the last decades of the eighteenth century with anthropology 
in the title. These often practically-oriented writings by philosophers and medics such as Ernst 
Platner, Gottfried Immanuel Wenzel, Karl Heinrich Pölitz, and Johann Karl Wezel offer a hybrid 
discourse comprising elements of popular philosophy, physiognomy, and psychology, which aim in 
part to address the perceived failure of abstract, a priori and logically constructed approaches to 
philosophy to either give access to absolute knowledge or guide us in more everyday questions of 
knowledge and action. 
One of Kant’s main concerns in his teleological approach was to wrest anthropology from the 
naturalists, like Ernst Platner, who had sought in the name of anthropological holism to establish the 
fundamentally physical origins of higher activities, such as memory, imagination, and reason (see 
Platner 1772, 117-194). Kant thinks that this holist approach does not do justice to human freedom 
and dignity, hence the cardinal distinction of his ‘pragmatic’ anthropology: physiology has to do with 
what nature makes of man, whereas pragmatics concerns itself with what man ‘can and should make 
of himself’. (Kant 2007, 231) According to DeArmey, the key concept of this biological-teleological 
approach is interest, which for James stands for ‘ends, desires, needs, wants, purposes, etc.’ 
(DeArmey 1986, 24) 
Sergio Franzese agrees, viewing philosophical anthropology as ‘a special discipline which blends 
together bio-medical science and the phenomenological analysis of human life as a coherent whole in 
order to define human nature’. (Franzese 2008, 52) But for Franzese, anthropology proposes not 
merely an alternative to science, but a rejection of science, insofar as he sees the ‘altogether more 
comprehensive anthropological image in which all the functions, higher and lower, organic and 
spiritual, are integrated in a single structural unity’, which demands James’s rejection of the 
‘“scientific,” namely, naturalistic study of man’. (Franzese 2008, 52) Similar to DeArmey, however, 
Franzese sees this tension as being resolved in ‘the view of the human being as the indeterminate 
being’. (Franzese 2008, 52) Once again, Kant’s anthropology is seen to be the model that allows for 
an accommodation between humankind’s unique status as a free rational agent and determinate, 
biological nature: ‘For James, Kant’s anthropology appeared not only as a way out of the prison of 
determinism, but also as a way to reconcile the natural and the spiritual in Man without being obliged 
to renounce other scientific knowledge or the higher meaningfulness of human life.’ (Franzese 2008, 
56-57) 
But what this picture of reconciliation overlooks is the fundamental tension between the contrasting 
positions taken by Kant and James as regards the philosophical status of experience, in other words as 
regards the possible relationships between philosophical categories and lived experience. This tension 
is brought into sharp relief in the so-called psychologism debates in the 1880s and 1890s, with James 
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explicitly rejecting the idea that experience and knowledge can depend on concepts that exist outside 
of experience. Neo-Kantian contemporaries of James thought that this rejection of apriorism and 
James’s focus on experience ‘reduc[ed] truth to the purely psychological experiences of the knower’ 
(Bordogna 2008, 172), and left no way of separating out ‘what is true, and what is thought to be true’ 
(Bordogna 2008, 167, original emphasis). 
At stake here is the very project of transcendental philosophy as a science that is able to ground 
knowledge and experience, as is brought out in the writings of the next generation of neo-Kantians, in 
particular those of Edmund Husserl. Psychology for Husserl is shorthand for subjectivism, which is at 
odds with the transcendental aims of his version of phenomenology. He wants phenomenology to be a 
‘science of transcendental subjectivity’ that ‘aims at absolute, ultimately valid truths which transcend 
all relativity’. (Husserl 1981, 315, 316) For Husserl phenomenology would thus furnish a ‘science of 
a completely new kind, without which psychology and the other sciences cannot be grounded 
philosophically.’ (Husserl 1981, 315) He classifies any attempt to dispense with such grounding as 
psychologism, as Maurice Merleau-Ponty explains: ‘The thesis of psychologism is precisely this: that 
psychology can take the place of philosophy.’ (Merleau-Ponty 1964, 56) 
The important point for our concerns here is that the model of knowledge that this ‘science of 
transcendental subjectivity’ seems to follow is a modern scientific one that prizes objectivity, at least 
insofar as philosophy stands or falls by virtue of its success in distinguishing objective (or at least 
transcendentally subjective) elements from those that are merely subjective, and the universal bases of 
knowledge and experience from those that are contingent and particular. Elsewhere I have discussed 
the ways in which this approach is in stark contrast to Scheler and others’ holistic-anthropological 
approach, according to which such grounds cannot be comprehensibly separated from the concrete 
life in which they appear (see Carroll 2017, chapter three). 
Anthropology: holism and skepticism 
What interests me here, and what comprises the basis of this article, is that similar debates about the 
relationship between selfhood and experience, and conceptual explanations and grounding were had 
in the period when Kant was writing, specifically in terms of epistemological, ontological, and 
methodological ideas surrounding the project of anthropology. The position taken by contributors to 
the discourse on anthropology was fundamentally holist, in the sense that they sought to account for 
human experience in the round. Their antipathy to philosophy that reckoned to separate essence and 
grounds from lived experience was at odds with Kant’s philosophical modus operandi, which 
precisely sought to isolate the pure and transcendental conditions of possibility of experience and 
knowledge from its contingent and particular instances. 
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To cite just one anthropological source at this stage, in 1799 Friedrich Schleiermacher published a 
famously scathing review of Kant’s Anthropology. In his view Kant’s apriorism precludes him from 
honouring the spirit of anthropology’s holistic approach. Schleiermacher, in the introduction to his 
book on ethics (1816), suggests that anthropology is split between its physical and psychological 
aspects, and as such ‘cannot be seen as a science’. (Schleiermacher 1967 II, 543) But it is also 
precisely this hybrid quality that he and others value in anthropology. In his appraisal of Kant he 
cautions that the empirical, descriptive, observational approach that anthropology is often identified 
with can relegate it to a mere ‘collection of trivia’. (Schleiermacher 1799, 300) He is not particularly 
explicit about what might save anthropology from this fate, but one can extrapolate from his critical 
comments on Kant’s work that empiricism is not the threat, but precisely the separation of 
‘physiological’ and ‘pragmatic’ anthropology, which he views as ‘incompatible’ with any kind of 
anthropology. At issue is not only Kant’s perceived failure to account for the sensuous dimension of 
life, in an approach that privileges reason, intellect and abstraction over man’s sensory or 
physiological dimension, but also the very idea that you can separate one from the other. Rather than 
corroborating Kant’s separation of man’s allegedly ‘natural’ and ‘rational’ aspects, ‘anthropology 
should be the joining together of them both, and only through this union can it exist’. (Schleiermacher 
1799, 302) 
Schleiermacher’s faithfulness to the ethos of anthropological holism is evident here, but it is important 
to understand that he is also making an epistemological point: he thinks that Kant’s transcendentalism, 
the desire to ground human knowledge and experience, thereby incorporating human freedom, 
contravenes the terms of his own critical project by aiming for what he terms a ‘closet realism 
[verborgener Realismus]’. (Schleiermacher 1799, 303) This reference to realism hints at what I see as 
the crucial epistemological implication of anthropological holism, which I read as an articulation of 
skepticism about the possibility of establishing philosophical grounds by means of hard-and-fast 
conceptual separation. Realism here is problematic for Schleiermacher the hermeneutician insofar as 
it presupposes an ability to separate the known from the knower, or conditions of possibility from the 
experience that manifests them. We shall see that this attitude is already evident in the increasing 
sense among those writers on anthropology that these kinds of separation and the objectivity that 
relies on it are not possible in matters that relate to human experience. 
In what follows I will firstly present what I see as the main anthropological elements of James’s 
position, namely (1) his preference for holism or antipathy to separation, (2) his concerns about the 
binomial terms of traditional philosophy, (3) his preference for experience over substances, (4) his 
sense that this holist doctrine of experience shows a way out of sterile impasses, (5) a preference for 
description over causation, and (6) the aforementioned skepticism. In the second section I will register 
the common ground with key ideas in the work of anthropologists from the last decades of the 
eighteenth century. My argument is not that the anthropologists influence James directly, but rather 
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that there is a remarkable similarity between his ideas and the arguments of this range of thinkers. I 
hope that awareness if these parallels will serve to reconceptualise the connection between James’s 
ideas and the tradition of anthropological thinking in German letters since the late eighteenth century, 
beyond its characterisation as a combination of scientific positivism and teleology. 
Anthropological elements in James’s radical empiricism 
Antipathy to separation 
We have registered James’s rejection of the idea that determinate experience depends on a level of 
experience that that is in some way independent of that experience. He does use the term a priori, but 
it is precisely used to denote experience before any kind of separation of its elements in conceptual 
analysis. In a way that perhaps misleadingly makes us think of a quality that is absolute or 
transcendental, he calls this ‘pure experience’, and refers to it as the only ‘stuff’ in the world. (James 
1912, 4) But the ‘pure’ nature of experience here does not indicate the kind of primacy or 
precondition of Kant’s a priori forms, but rather expresses James’s antipathy to separation: 
 
By the adjective ‘pure’ prefixed to the word ‘experience’ I mean to denote a form of being 
which is as yet neutral or ambiguous, and prior to the object and subject distinction. I mean to 
show that the attribution either of mental or physical being to an experience is due to nothing 
in the immediate stuff of which the experience is composed – for the same stuff will serve for 
either attribute. (Perry 1935 II, 385) 
 
 
The same idea is denoted by a range of other adjectives – direct, instant, concrete, active, lived – and 
the idea is always basically the same: that such experience happens prior to any differentiation of 
subject from object, of thing from thought, or of forms from content: ‘The instant field of the present 
is always experience in its pure state, plain unqualified actuality, a simple that, as yet undifferentiated 
into thing and thought, and only virtually classifiable as objective fact or as some one’s opinion about 
fact.’ (James 1912, 74) 
 
Does this amount to a capitulation to sheer and undifferentiated experience, about which we can say 
nothing definitive? This was one of the criticisms of James’s opponents in the psychologism debates. 
But an alternative view, and one I favour, is to say that the rejection of such differentiation is an 
attempt to avoid binomial terms, like subject and object, knower and known, form and content, by 
means of which philosophy has traditionally explained determinate experience. Numerous statements 
by James support this view, of which I will cite two: 
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The first great pitfall from which such a radical standing by experience will save us is an 
artificial conception of the relations between knower and known. (James 1912, 52) 
Throughout the history of philosophy the subject and its object have been treated as 
absolutely discontinuous entities. […] [A]ll sorts of theories had to be invented to overcome 
[this separation of knower and known, subject and object]. (James 1912, 52) 
 
We have noted that this ‘radical standing by experience’ was viewed as a threat to the project of 
philosophy, but it is clear that James sees the binomial concepts in terms of which knowledge and 
experience have been theorised as a theoretical sticking plaster only made necessary by a failure to 
grasp experience more concretely: 
 
The natural result of such a world-picture has been the efforts of rationalism to correct its 
incoherencies by the addition of transexperiential agents of unification, substances, 
intellectual categories and powers, or Selves; whereas, if empiricism had only been radical 
and taken everything that comes without disfavor, conjunction as well as separation, each at 
its face value, the results would have called for no such artificial correction. (James 1912, 43-
44) 
 
So whilst Bruce Wilshire argues that James’s doctrine of experience places ‘great theoretical load on 
the concept of pure experience: a single pure experience must be perceiver, perception, and perceived’ 
(Wilshire 1968, 170), this might be taken to misconstrue James’s concern, which precisely proposes 
overcoming the standard theoretical categories and separations, as John Wild puts it: ‘This means an 
abandonment of theoretical constructions that may have become habitual, and even incorporated in 
accepted modes of speech, like the terms mind and body. We must make an effort to place these 
interpretations in suspense, in order to regain the feeling of a lived situation.’ (Wild 1969, 361) 
 
James’s antipathy to the separations that he sees as necessitating such ‘transexperiential forms’ is 
expressed in various ways: firstly, in terms of meaning as an active process, such as his reference to 
an ‘active element in all consciousness, […] a spiritual something […] which seems to go out to meet 
these qualities and contents, whilst they seem to come in to be received by it.’ (James 1890 I, 285, 
original italics) Likewise he asks, ‘[w]hy insist that knowing is a static relation out of time when it 
practically seems so much a function of our active life?’ (James 1912, 75) He contends that ‘this 
activity of meaning formation goes on in the world where meaning comes into being. Hence it can be 
studied as it is directly experienced, described and analysed.’ (Wild 1969, 233) Secondly, it is 
expressed in terms of what we might call the ‘worldly’ quality of experience, as in the above 
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characterisation of meaning formation as ‘go[ing] on in the world’. It is also evident in James’s view 
of experience as both generating and fitting into a coherent whole that accompanies experience from 
birth: ‘The first sensation which an infant gets is for him the Universe. And the universe which he 
later comes to know is nothing but an amplification and an implication of that first simple germ.’ 
(James 1890 II, 8) To quote Bruce Wilshire, this is to say ‘that we can never perceive a thing without 
perceiving a world’. (Wilshire 1968, 163) 
 
But whilst it expresses the parameters of possible experience, this worldly quality does not make it 
possible in any Kantian sense. Rather, and a third way in which James’s refutes separation, such 
forms are seen to be secondary to active, concrete, lived experience: they are ‘contingent’ (Wild 1969, 
50, see also 233) and not legislating: ‘These ordering forms originate in the mind, it is true, and not 
from experience. But they are not changeless nor do they have “as Kant pretended […] a legislating 
character even for all possible experience”’ (James 1980 I, 664-5, see also Wild 1969, 232). Here 
James does express the view that such forms originate elsewhere than experience, but only at the same 
time as he severely limits any claims regarding their philosophical status. It is in this vein that John 
Wild insists that ‘[c]onceptual thought may clarify and extend the range of meanings that are present 
in perception. This is not guaranteed, however, by any a priori status of reason. It is a hope that may 
be approximated by historical effort and struggle.’ (Wild 1969, 52) 
Against dualism 
This antipathy to the separations of traditional philosophy causes some commentators to associate 
James’s thinking with a turn against Cartesian dualism, with Owen Flanagan for instance interpreting 
James’s late Essays in Radical Empiricism as marking ‘the culmination of two decades worth of 
thinking that there was something wrong with substance dualism’. (Flanagan 1997, 43) From here it is 
a small step to characterise him as a monist, supported by his reference to experience as involving the 
same ‘immediate stuff’. (James 1912, 2) But even his repeated references to ‘concrete’ experience 
(see e.g. James 1912, 117) or to the ‘felt’ quality of experience must not cause us to think in terms of 
substances, as monism tends to do. In James’s doctrine of experience it is anathema to reduce 
experience to something substantial, because: ‘thoughts in the concrete are fully real. But thoughts in 
the concrete are made of the same stuff as things are.’ (James 1912, 37) This is why Flanagan resists 
all accounts of experience that posit any component of our experience as ‘a thing, a substance, or an 
entity’. (Flanagan 1997, 45) 
But this non-substantialist ontology does not mean that we must align James with idealism. Indeed, 
the point is here that the antipathy to separation that is at the heart of his doctrine of experience 
reckons to make such classifications as realism and idealism redundant. For James it makes no sense 
to distinguish between material and immaterial aspects of experience, as Flanagan puts it: 
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Experiences will do. What will happen […] is that our experiences will relate in ways that 
typically lead to the constructions of certain distinctions, for example, between what is mental 
and nonmental. But this distinction can be made without commitment to some essential 
underlying ontological difference. (Flanagan 1997, 45) 
Likewise, James Edie insists that ‘the philosophy of James is neither a philosophy of objects and 
actions nor a philosophy of ideas; it is a philosophy of the experience of objects and actions in which 
the subject itself is a participant.’ (Edie 1965, 121) In a similar vein, James’s approach precisely 
questions the distinction between internal, mental, individual and external, social elements of 
experience, with James referring to ‘appreciations’ as ‘an ambiguous sphere of being, belonging with 
emotion on the one hand, and having objective “value” on the other, yet seeming not quite inner nor 
quite outer […].’ (James 1912, 34) For Edie this means James’s approach cannot be aligned in any 
straightforward way with idealism or realism: ‘Must we therefore say that James remains on the side 
of “realism” versus “idealism,” or is he not rather, […] also searching for a way out of this sterile 
impasse, for a theory of experience which will be neither realistic nor idealistic but 
phenomenological?’ (Edie 1965, 119) 
Causation, description, skepticism 
One interconnection about which James is particularly circumspect is causal connection between 
aspects of experience. As Wilshire puts it, ‘[f]or […] James the notion of sensation as a mental state, 
insofar as it is an element in the stream of consciousness, is specifiable only internally, or in 
conjunction with that which it is of, i.e. things in space. Thus the attempt to relate them through 
contingent and causal reasoning is an absurdity.’ (Wilshire 1968, 166) For this reason James’s 
analysis of human experience is seen to prefer description to causal analysis: ‘the lesson that was so 
painfully taught by the Principles: the causal analysis of mind must give up priority of inquiry to the 
descriptive and the cognitive.’ (Wilshire 1968, 170) Whilst James sometimes disparages description 
as a primitive stage in science (see James 1890 II, 448 and 454), in the Principles it becomes the 
primary method. 
And it is important to reiterate here that in terms of epistemology opting for a methodology of 
description need not be aligned with positivism, but is for James a consequence of skepticism about 
the availability of other options. It is precisely not scientifically grounded naturalism, which James 
had once held to, and which we have noted that others view as linking him to philosophical 
anthropology. Certainly, in the Preface to the Principles he insists: ‘I have kept close to the point of 
view of natural science throughout the book.’ (James 1890 I, v) Likewise in 1875 he had written: ‘A 
real science of man is now being built up out of the theory of evolution and the facts of archaeology, 
the nervous system and the senses’ (cited in Franzese 2008, 52). But in the later, shorter version of his 
psychology book, James is more skeptical: 
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When we talk of “psychology as a natural science,” we must not assume that that means a sort 
of psychology that stands at last on solid ground. It means just the reverse; it means a 
psychology particularly fragile, and into which the waters of metaphysical criticism leak at 
every joint, a psychology all of whose elementary assumptions and data must be reconsidered 
in wider connections […]. A string of raw facts; a little gossip and wrangle about opinions; a 
little classification and generalization on the mere descriptive level . . . but not a single law in 
the sense in which physics shows us laws, not a single proposition from which any 
consequence can causally be deduced. [. . .] This is no science, it is only the hope of a science. 
(James 1892, 334-5) 
 
And in the Essays on Radical Empiricism he explicitly associates his approach with skepticism, 
noting that critics of humanism ‘have showered blows on doctrines – subjectivism and skepticism, for 
example’ (James 1912, 52, see also Wild 1969, 52). 
Anthropology 
If space permitted one might draw links between James’s positions here and those of the classical 
twentieth century philosophical anthropologists, most notably Max Scheler and Arnold Gehlen. The 
parallels are evident in their anti-dualist or holist approach to experience, in particular their doubts 
about the merit of isolating apriori aspects of experience, and their tentativeness as regards drawing 
general conclusions about causal links between aspects of human reality. Sometimes this similarity 
extends to the very terminology they use. Like James, Scheler uses the notion of value to denote the 
way in which our inner perception is entwined with a web of attitudes in the external world: ‘the 
world is given in lived-experience as the “bearer of values”’. (Scheler 1973, 143) And James’ sense of 
such values being ‘not quite inner nor quite outer’ is all but replicated in Gehlen’s sense that we 
inhabit an ‘inner outer-world’. (Gehlen 1988, 339-40) 
But Gehlen is citing the eighteenth century poet and philosopher Novalis here, and what interests me 
is that all of the above aspects of James’s doctrine of experience feature at some point in the 
anthropological thinking that took place in the late eighteenth century, a hundred years and more 
before he was writing: the antipathy to separation, in particular the concern about categorical, 
conceptual separations; the validation of subjective experience and the concern to account for lived 
experience in ways that contrast with an ontology that works by such separations; the sense 
understanding the nature of selfhood and reality in these holist terms might offer a way out of the 
dualist impasses of dominant approaches to philosophy; the focus on a looser notion of 
interconnection, and the concomitant preference for a methodology of description in place of 
causation; and the association with skepticism. In what follows I will register relevant sources for 
each of these overlaps in turn, which I hope will support a reading of James not as a neo-Kantian, but 
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as part of an anthropological tradition that refutes the dualism at the heart of Kant’s philosophical 
method. 
Holism, naturalism, description 
Holism is the watchword of anthropology from Ernst Platner onwards. Heinrich Benedict von Weber, 
for instance, in the first volume of his Anthropologische Versuche zur Beförderung einer gründlichen 
und umfassenden Menschenkunde für Wissenschaft und Leben (1810) defines ‘true anthropology’ as 
the ‘science of the whole, concrete human, an external and internal science of the human 
[Menschenlehre] together’. (Weber 1810/1817 I, 7)  This holism is part of what is referred to as a 
‘naturalist’ turn in the eighteenth century (see for instance Käuser 1990, 201), evident for instance in 
Johann Georg Sulzer’s insistence in Investigations into the origin of pleasant and unpleasant 
sensations [Untersuchung über den Ursprung der angenehmen und unangenehmen Empfindungen] 
(1751/1752) that imagination has a basically physiological basis (see Dürbeck 1998, 135). This 
physiological orientation, which we also registered in Platner’s ideas, may be seen as a consequence 
of the transition from a philosophical to a medical approach to human experience and capacities, 
centring on biology and physiology. But the epistemological implications of this bio-medical 
approach are not straightforward. For some commentators it is accompanied by a positivist 
epistemology, with some medics consciously seeking to distance themselves from techniques and 
practices that were deemed to be overly theoretical, as Elizabeth Williams puts it: ‘As “positive” 
techniques of medicine – clinical observation, statistical inquiry, and especially pathological anatomy 
– gained more advocates, the old “philosophical” medicine of the erudite theoretician was dismissed 
as superannuated, speculative, and metaphysical.’ (Williams 1994, 13)  
Some doctors consciously avoided fundamental philosophical questions such as metaphysical 
reflections on beginnings, in which vein Samuel Tissot, writing in 1768, draws a clear distinction 
between the physician’s concerns and those of metaphysics: 
Metaphysics investigates the causes of the influence of the mind on the body and of the body 
on the mind: medicine [Arzneykunst] concerns itself with objects [Gegenständen] that are 
more slight [weniger groß] but perhaps more certain, and is happy not to ascend [aufsteigen] 
to the question of first causes of this mutual influence of both substances which comprise the 
human, but rather contents itself with the detailed observation of the appearances that derive 
from this. (Tissot 1768, 16-17) 
Physician Hieronymus David Gaub and scientist Georges-Louis Buffon separately identified 
description as a way to avoid getting lost in teleological explanations of final causes (see for instance 
Hieronymous David Gaub, Institutiones Pathologiae (1758) and Georges-Louis Buffon, Buffon’s 
Natural History (1797), both cited in Steinke 2005, 202). 
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And the anthropologists, many of whom were physicians, followed suit, in a way that tells the other 
side of the story of Kant’s turn against the naturalist aspect of anthropological holism. As opposed to 
the methodologies of conceptual abstraction, speculation, or deduction associated with rationalist and 
then Kantian philosophy, anthropology is claimed by its proponents to proceed by means of what 
Roger Smith calls a ‘descriptive approach to knowledge’ (Smith 1995, 95, see also Zammito 2002, 
Käuser 1990, Williams 1994, 80, Moravia 1980, 247), emblematic of which is Herder’s maxim: ‘Not 
speculation [Vernünfteln], but gathering [Sammeln].’ (Herder 1985, 672) 
Skepticism: man as puzzle or anti-dualism 
But whilst description may rescue us from theoretical abstraction, it should not be equated with any 
kind of simple positivism, as should be apparent from the aforementioned association of anthropology 
with skepticism.  For Wolfgang Riedel this skepticism is so central to philosophical anthropology that 
he asserts ‘where philosophy becomes skeptical, it becomes […] anthropological’. (Riedel 1994, 96) 
There is repeated reference in the eighteenth century to anthropology’s skeptical aspect, for instance 
in the characterisation of the human as puzzle and the sense that any knowledge of the link between 
body and soul is fraught with ‘difficulties that cannot be overcome [unüberwindliche 
Schwierigkeiten]’. (Linden 1976, 43) Karl Pölitz for instance refers to man as ‘the puzzling 
[rätselhafte] being, sensory and super-sensory, combined in us into a unity’. (Pölitz 1800, 5) It is in 
this sense that the recent commentator Hans-Peter Krüger describes the basis of philosophical 
anthropology as ‘negative’, explaining: ‘The essence of the human is in the final analysis 
unfathomable [unergründlich].’ (Krüger 2001, 30)  
Here we must distinguish between skepticism relating to the make-up of the human, which becomes a 
puzzle when the examination of it starts with dualist premises, and skepticism about the idea that 
human experience and our understanding of it can be grounded with reference to transcendental 
categories: the point is that those who are skeptical about the latter precisely reject that the former is a 
problem. In other words, several of the eighteenth century writers on anthropology precisely refute the 
idea that the human is a puzzle for anything other than the abstracting philosophical gaze, and they do 
so precisely in the name of concrete, lived experience. 
It is important to register here that anthropological holism develops in the shadow cast by Cartesian 
dualism: that is to say, not dualism per se, but the sense that man’s dual nature is somehow a problem, 
that man is made up of two different kinds of substance that do not add up or whose interconnection 
needs to be explained theoretically. There is a range of positions, with some writers retaining dualist 
categories and referring to the interactions between them, and others questioning the very basis of 
substance dualism. A seminal instance of the latter is Johann Herder, who in his most anthropological 
essay, ‘On Cognition and Sensation, the Two Main Forces of the Human Soul’ (1778), insists that 
only philosophical thinking abstracts reason from sensation. Thus the stated aim is not to explain the 
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interconnection between mental and corporeal experience, nor to achieve harmony between the two. 
Rather because things are interconnected in experience, the challenge is for knowledge to trace and 
describe the manifold interrelations between disparate elements. 
Several of the contributors to the discourse on anthropology in the late eighteenth century state 
explicitly that they are not interested in explaining the interconnection between body and mind, rather 
they precisely take man’s unity as a starting premise, as the sine qua non of meaningful experience. 
Platner for example insists that the question of how the connection between soul and world is possible 
is irrelevant to him (see Platner 1772, xi-xii). Johann Georg Heinrich Feder sees the connection 
between mind and body as being a matter of everyday experience, albeit that he does not want to give 
up on dualist categories (see Linden 1976, 42). Even Kant claims in a letter that his anthropology 
would ‘omit entirely’ the ‘subtle and, to my view eternally futile inquiries as to the manner in which 
the bodily organs are connected with thought’. (Kant 1999, 141) He remarks in his Anthropology that 
any attempts to establish anthropology as a ‘science with thoroughness encounter[s] considerable 
difficulties that are inherent in human nature itself’. The difficulties he lists include man’s self-
consciousness when being observed and the operation of habit, which ‘make it difficult for the human 
being to judge how to consider himself’, and ultimately ‘make it very difficult for anthropology to rise 
to the rank of a formal science.’ (Kant 2007, 233) In the face of what Philip Blosser calls ‘the 
impossibility of a rational psychology of the soul that would yield substantive knowledge of the soul’ 
(Blosser 2002, 42), Kant’s response is to claim the existence of transcendental grounds. But 
Schleiermacher’s criticism of Kant’s anthropology precisely centres on the concern that the price of 
grounding in Kantian thinking is the perpetuation of a dualism that separates experience into a priori 
and empirical, free and determined aspects, etc.  
Anti-theoretical attitude 
And the response among some anthropologists to this ‘impossibility’ is precisely not abstract and 
universal, but often anti-theoretical and concrete – and it is this approach that makes the link with the 
methodology of description that we started with above. So whilst some, such as the Kantian Carl 
Schmid, ultimately ranked anthropology below philosophy (see Schmid 1791, 8), which is described 
as ‘true, rationally grounded knowledge [wahre Vernunfterkenntnis]’ (Schmid 1791, 10), other 
proponents of anthropology, as we have seen with some of the physicians who preceded them, 
rejected key principles, methodologies, and objectives of speculative, transcendental philosophy: 
apriorism, rationalistic deduction or speculation, and philosophy’s quest for absolute grounds. It is in 
this vein that Karl Pölitz contrasted ‘skeptical’ anthropology with teleological or physiological 
anthropology (Pölitz 1800, 9-10), a comment that underlines the idea that we must beware of 
identifying all theories associated with anthropology as teleological. Pölitz saw anthropology as 
taking place in the wake of the failure of metaphysical, systematic philosophy. As such, anthropology 
is seen to attempt no 
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historical representations of the various philosophical opinions about the relationship of 
things to appearances, raised to the level of a science, leaving this higher portrayal and the 
way that it dignifies the various scholastic metaphysical systems, or more accurately the 
history of philosophy, after the fall of systematic metaphysics. (Pölitz 1800, 14-15) 
 
Moritz, Wezel and the ‘wobbly’ system 
A similar critique of overly systematic metaphysical explanations is evident in the writings of the 
pioneering psychologist Karl Philipp Moritz and of the poet and anthropological thinker Johann Karl 
Wezel. In ‘Vorschlag zu einem Magazin einer Erfahrungs-Seelenkunde’ (1783) Moritz argued that 
any ‘system of morality’ may only serve as an ‘approximate outline [ohngefährer Grundriß]’, which 
we should apply ‘as loosely [schwankend] as possible; merely establishing a few points, but not yet 
drawing the lines from one point to another, rather waiting until these lines draw themselves.’ (Moritz 
2006, 798-9) In a similar vein he prefers ‘observations from real life’ to those ‘ladled from books’. 
(Moritz 2006, 795) And Fernando Vidal describes the combination of empirical observation and 
rational reflection in his Magazin zur Erfarungsseelenkunde (1783-93) as ‘reject[ing] the abstract and 
intellectualizing language of the mental faculties in favour of observations which often took the form 
of existential and personal narratives, based on the examination of the self.’ (Vidal 2011, 112) 
Wezel likewise insisted that universally valid statements about interconnections between self and 
reality are not available. Knowledge can and must rise above the subjective and personal, but only to a 
level that is ‘relatively general’. (Wezel 1804-5 I, 36) In his two-volume Versuch über die Kenntnis 
vom Menschen (1784/5) Wezel states his aim as being to explicate the interconnected elements of 
experience without abstracting or reductive explanation. Interestingly, he limits his explanation of the 
interconnections between different elements of the self to a seemingly intentionally vague ‘law of 
general interconnection [allgemeinen Verknüpfung]’. (Wezel 1784/5 I, 129) Jutta Heinz points out 
that statements about the nature of any interconnections between different aspects of reality must be 
guided not by ‘ideological assumptions [Vorannahmen] or metaphysical certainties’ but by 
experienced interconnections. (Heinz 1996, 37) She sees the eschewing of ‘any absolute definitions’ 
in Wezel’s Versuch as emblematic of a gradual ‘emancipation’ of anthropology from philosophy. 
(Heinz 1996, 69, 38) Likewise Herbert Schnädelbach sees anthropology precisely as marking a 
waning of the idea that transcendental-metaphysical philosophical has special access to reality: 
‘Philosophising does not have its own special access to reality; it is always mediated by experience 
and the empirical sciences.’ (Schnädelbach 1989, 32) 
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Lived experience and Schütz’s anthropological psychology 
Heinz and Schnädelbach’s references to experience and to empirical science reflect the widespread 
view among eighteenth century anthropologists that considerations of the nature of selfhood and 
reality should be more closely wedded to concretely lived experience. We have already registered von 
Weber’s definition of ‘true anthropology’ as the ‘science of the whole, concrete human’. (von Weber 
1810, 7) Kant himself associated anthropology with experience rather than speculation (see Kant 
2012, 446), and Wezel subtitled his System of Empirical Anthropology (1803) a ‘study of human 
experience [Erfahrungsmenschenlehre]’. 
This revalidation of experience indicates that anthropology should not be considered in isolation from 
discipline of psychology, and a brief excursus here is helpful. Since its inception in the writings of 
Christian Wolff in the 1730s, psychology had wrestled with the tension between necessarily 
subjective empirical experience and the rationalist aspect of psychology, which deduces abstract 
concepts and develops more or less systematic accounts of allegedly a priori capacities and qualities 
that make experience possible, such as the unity of identity. But in the second half of the eighteenth 
century, in a shift that Wolfgang Riedel calls a ‘psychologisation of philosophy’ (Riedel 1994, 106), 
empirical psychology begins to overturn the subordinate position of empirical introspection. Evidence 
of this shift is to be found in the work of Johann Georg Sulzer, who already in 1759 had insisted that 
one could not deduce all qualities of the soul from its ‘essence [Wesen]’, and therefore prioritised 
empirical psychology as the ‘most important’ aspect of this science of the soul. (Sulzer 1759, 156, 
157) 
But this privileging of empirical experience arguably merely opts for one side of this rationalist-
empiricist divide over another. A more nuanced approach comes with Christian Gottfried Schütz’s 
remarkable essay, ‘Betrachtungen über die verschiedenen Methoden der Psychologie’ (1771), in 
which he called for a methodology that combines empirical and rationalist elements, both of which 
have their weaknesses. The former may appear more reliable and certain, but he lists the manifold 
obstacles that stand in the way of our own self-perception, for example the speed of our successive 
thoughts, our own enthusiasm, the assumption that we know ourselves already, and the fact that we all 
wear social masks (see Schütz 1771 2, 197-202). Rationalist analysis may supplement experience, but 
is itself beset by its own difficulties. For instance, he points out that the deduction of causal 
connections is difficulty, not least because ‘one and the same tendency may have several causes’. 
(Schütz 1771 2, 202) As Vidal puts it – in terms that echo Moritz and Wezel’s hesitancy about such 
schema – this kind of methodology ‘required a lively but orderly imagination, and the formulation of 
a small number of principles’. (Vidal 2011, 138-9) It is of particular note for our concerns that Schütz 
characterises the eclectic methodology that he thinks psychology should adopt as anthropological: ‘It 
would be much more advantageous if psychology were treated more like anthropology.’ (Schütz 1771 
2, 268) 
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The uncertain self 
This underlying hesitancy about schema and systems means that I can only partly agree with 
Schnädelbach’s above-cited remark regarding the ‘scientific’ quality of empirical approaches to 
experienced reality. Thinkers associated with anthropology recognise that the proximity to lived 
experience they seek brings with it what Brian Jacobs calls a ‘denial of certainty’ around knowledge 
of one’s own self, which is ‘on an order altogether different than that of the natural sciences’. (Jacobs 
2003, 111) Jacobs is referring to Kant here, but some thinkers in the late eighteenth century went 
further than Kant in questioning some of the qualities bestowed upon selfhood by rationalist 
deduction, such as the coherence of identity and of inner representations. Wezel is one such thinker, 
and another is Christoph Meiners, professor of philosophy in Göttingen. Meiners insists in his essay 
‘Psychologisches Fragment über die Verschiedenheiten des inner Bewußtseins’ that we can have a 
sense of selfhood without feeling that we are always identical (see Meiners 1775/6 2, 39) in a way that 
was unusual at the time. This insight is part of what motivates his desire, expressed in the preface to 
his Grundriß der Seelenlehre (1786), to reconceptualise philosophy as a study of man, centred on 
psychology and distinct from mathematics and natural science. By this time Wezel had also developed 
a notion of the fallible self, referring in Versuch über die Kenntnis vom Menschen (1784-1785) to the 
self as a fleeting collection of effects: 
Many philosophers speak of the soul as if they were thinking of memory, imagination, and 
understanding as separate elements that stand next to one another, or as if ideas were like 
images on a screen [Bilder auf der Leinwand]. He however who thinks of everything in the 
human and the soul as fleeting effects, which we might compare for example with the tone of 
the satyrs or with vibrations in the air is on a much better path. (Wezel 1784/85 I, 65-6) 
Closing remarks: common ground 
Some aspects of the parallels between James’s epistemological attitude and those of the 
anthropologists and psychologists of the late eighteenth century are clear. Both prefer proximity to 
lived experience over theoretical system-building. And whilst it is only with the twentieth century 
anthropologists that James’s ideas come to be replicated almost verbatim, such as that the knower and 
known cannot easily be separated, or that inner experience has a worldly quality, it is important to see 
that these attitudes can be traced back to the signature ontological holism of eighteenth century 
writings on anthropology, and its related epistemological skepticism. In those writings the preference 
for lived experience is primarily a rejection of Cartesian dualism, and the problems it generates, of 
precisely the kind that we see replicated in James’s formulations. Likewise, in his writings experience 
is conceived as an alternative to overly systematic ‘agents of unification’, a circumspect attitude about 
theoretical models that overstate the products of rationalist deduction with strong echoes of the 
eighteenth century concerns. James and the anthropologists’ more skeptical epistemology also gives 
rise to a methodological preference for description rather than definitive claims about causation. And 
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whilst we might say that Scheler and Gehlen follow suit in this respect, my argument here has been 
that we would also do well to look further back to the history of anthropological thinking. Rather than 
identifying his anthropology as comprised of ‘science plus teleology’, or viewing him as neo-Kantian, 
this might help to locate James in an – essentially anthropological – tradition whose holism is 
fundamentally at odds with the dualist approach of Kantian philosophy. 
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